Read this in The Manila Times digital edition.
SOMETIMES the best way to test a constitutional interpretation is not by examining ordinary situations, but by asking whether it still makes sense when pushed to its logical extreme.
Consider a disturbing but revealing hypothetical.
Suppose a president, vice president, chief justice, or any other impeachable official becomes so ruthless and desperate to cling to power that he or she orders the assassination of nine senators. Under one interpretation of the Constitution, the Senate would still need the concurrence of two-thirds of all 24 senators, or 16 votes, to convict in an impeachment trial.
But if only 15 senators remain alive, conviction becomes mathematically impossible. The official could no longer be removed through impeachment. In effect, the Constitution would reward the destruction of the very institution tasked with imposing accountability.
If that conclusion strikes you as absurd, it is because it is. And that is precisely why constitutional provisions should not be interpreted that way.
The Constitution provides that no person shall be convicted in an impeachment trial without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. Some insist that "all the members of the Senate" always means 24 senators regardless of circumstances. According to this view, the constitutional threshold remains fixed at 16 votes no matter how many senators are actually capable of participating.
Twenty-four senators constitute the Senate. Two-thirds of 24 is 16. Therefore, 16 votes are always required.
The problem is that constitutional interpretation is not merely an exercise in arithmetic.
Constitutions are legal frameworks designed to govern real societies. They are not mathematical puzzles detached from practical reality. Their provisions must be read in a manner that allows government institutions to function and constitutional mechanisms to operate.
A constitutional interpretation that destroys the functionality of a constitutional process should immediately be viewed with suspicion.
The purpose of impeachment is accountability. It is the Constitution's ultimate mechanism for removing high-ranking officials who commit serious offenses against the public trust. If an interpretation allows an impeachable official to make removal impossible simply by reducing the number of senators below the conviction threshold, then that interpretation defeats the very purpose of impeachment itself.
No constitutional provision should be construed in a manner that enables its own nullification.
The issue becomes even clearer when one moves beyond assassination and considers other possibilities.
Suppose several senators die in a natural disaster, a foreign invasion prevents senators from attending sessions, or senators are kidnapped by insurgents. Suppose a pandemic, war, or other catastrophe renders a significant number of senators unable to participate.
Would impeachment suddenly become impossible because the Senate can no longer reach a fixed numerical threshold designed for a fully constituted chamber?
Such a conclusion would effectively suspend one of the Constitution's most important accountability mechanisms precisely when the nation may need it most.
Constitutional systems are not designed to collapse whenever circumstances become extraordinary. The Supreme Court itself has long recognized that constitutional provisions should be interpreted in a manner that avoids absurd results and preserves the effectiveness of governmental institutions. Courts generally reject interpretations that produce irrational consequences or defeat the purpose of the law.
This principle is particularly important in provisions governing legislative bodies.
When the Constitution speaks of majorities, quorums and voting requirements, it assumes the existence of a functioning institution capable of acting. If circumstances permanently reduce the membership that can actually participate, the relevant question becomes whether the constitutional body itself continues to exist and function, not whether some theoretical numerical ideal remains attainable.
Otherwise, one arrives at bizarre conclusions.
Imagine a Senate reduced to 15 members because nine seats become vacant through death, incapacity, or some national catastrophe. Under the rigid "24 forever" interpretation, those 15 senators could still constitute the Senate, still conduct legislative business, still pass laws, still exercise oversight functions, and still perform virtually every constitutional responsibility assigned to them.
Yet they could never convict an impeachable official because a mathematical threshold tied to a Senate that no longer exists in fact would continue to govern.
That is not constitutional interpretation. That is constitutional paralysis.
More troublingly, it creates what may be called an "assassin's veto." An impeachable official willing to eliminate enough senators could effectively place himself or herself beyond constitutional accountability. The more successful the attack on the Senate, the safer the official becomes from removal.
Surely no rational constitution can be read to create such an incentive.
The Constitution was written to prevent tyranny, not to reward it.
This does not mean that conviction thresholds should be casually reduced whenever vacancies arise. Impeachment remains an extraordinary remedy and conviction should require a substantial supermajority. The point is not to weaken impeachment standards but to recognize that constitutional institutions must remain capable of functioning despite extraordinary circumstances.
A constitutional system must be resilient enough to survive crises, disasters, and even attacks against its own institutions. History teaches us that constitutional crises rarely occur under perfect conditions. They occur during wars, insurrections, pandemics, political violence, and institutional breakdowns. These are precisely the moments when accountability mechanisms become most important.
A constitutional interpretation that disables accountability during such moments is not protecting the Constitution. It is undermining it. This is why common sense matters in constitutional interpretation.
Common sense is not a substitute for legal analysis. It is a safeguard against interpretations that become detached from reality. When a constitutional argument leads to the conclusion that an impeachable official can evade removal by ensuring that too few senators remain alive to convict, something has gone seriously wrong with the argument.
The Constitution must be read as a coherent instrument designed to preserve democratic governance and public accountability. It should never be interpreted in a manner that allows its own safeguards to be defeated by violence, catastrophe, or institutional sabotage.
Otherwise, we end up with the terrifying possibility that the surest way for a corrupt and ruthless impeachable official to avoid conviction is to ruthlessly inflict corruption on the political order and eliminate enough of the judges sitting in judgment.
That is not constitutional fidelity.
That is stupidity.
The author is a professor at the University of the Philippines Los Baños and vice chairman of the board of the state-run PTVNI.